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be partial to junior shareholders the opportunity of discriminating
against holders of non-cumulative preferred stock by allowing the
profits of the corporation to accumulate over a period of years instead
of declaring dividends from the profits as they accrue each year.10
However, a court of equity will compel directors to declare a dividend
where it is clear that a fraudulent accumulation of profits is being
allowed." But it is obvious that the relief to be obtained from such
a remedy is more apparent than real because of the great difficulty
in proving such a discrimination and the reluctance of equity to in-
terfere with corporate management. 12 The result of the instant de-
cision at least gives a definite legal meaning to "non-cumulative pre-
ferred stock" and requires, in order to protect the holders of such
stock from discrimination by a partial corporate directorate, the in-
sertion of express provisions in corporate charters and stock certifi-
cates entitling the holders of non-cumulative preferred stock to par-
ticipate in those profits which have accumulated over a period of
years upon which yearly dividends have not been declared.
J. FRAZIER GLENN, JR.
Evidence-Effect of Uncontradicted Rebutting Evidence on Pre-
sumption of Respondeat Superior in Automobile Accidents
Among the many problems that have arisen because of the
widespread use of automotive transportation is the one dealing with
the increasing number of automobile accidents. Statistics supplied
by the National Safety Council of Chicago show that motor vehicle
fatalities have increased at the rate of approximately two thousand
per year since 1925 despite the more efficient precautionary methods
10 See Berle, Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock, supra note 4, for detailed
illustration of how the accumulation of profits over a period of years will
affect holders of non-cumulative preferred stock.
It is true as a general proposition that directors of a corporation, in allow-
ing profits to accumulate over a period of years, have some sound business
reason for so doing, but it is not improbable that in many cases the real reason
for allowing profits to accumulate is the desire of the directors to further their
own financial interests-if they own junior stock, either directly or indirectly.
Hazeltine v. Belfast, etc. Ry. Co., 79 Me. 411, 10 At. 328, 1 Am. St. Rep.
330 (1887); In re Brantman, 244 Fed. 101 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1917); Dodge v.
Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N. W. 668, 3 A. L. R. 413 (1919) ; Cannon
v. Wischassett Mills Co., 195 N. C. 119, 141 S. E. 344 (1928). It should be
noted, however, that a declaration of dividends from those profits which are
in excess of a working capital can be required by any shareholder under N. C.
Cons. Stat. Ann (1919) §1178.
"Morse v. Boston and M. R. R., 263 Mass. 308, 160 N. E. 894 (1928);
Fernald v. Frank Ridlon Co., 246 Mass. 64, 140 N. E. 421 (1923).
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of avoiding them which are in use today. When one considers the
fact that more United States citizens are killed every year by auto-
mobiles than were killed in the late war and that for every person
killed there are approximately thirty-five persons injured,' it is quite
easy to sympathize, not only with those who have been injured, but
also with the courts of this country which are faced with the prob-
lem of dealing justice in the thousands of suits which have arisen
as a result of automobile accidents. Some of the practical difficulties
with which the courts and the parties are confronted in the handling
of such suits under the present system are: (1) "The difficulty, de-
lay, expense, annoyance, and uncertainty of litigation, in which the
determination of negligence and the exact amount of damage are in-
volved; (2) the failure of compensation in many cases because of the
financial irresponsibility of many defendants; and, (3) the economic
loss and personal hardship resulting from uncompensated injuries."
'2
Expert committees, legislators, and lawyers have advocated the adop-
tion of one or more of the following remedies :3 (1) Special courts
to try motor vehicle cases ;4 (2) shifting the burden of proof, not
only in suits against drivers for negligent injuries caused by them,
but also by extending the doctrine of respondeat superior;5 (3) re-
quiring automobile owners to take out liability insurance ;e (4) com-
pulsory liability laws to be administered by Special Boards.7 The
'See Ballantine, A Study of Compensation for Automobile Accidents (Feb.
1930) 16 A. B. A. J. 97.
'Supra note 1.
"Last June work was begun by a voluntary committee known as the
Committee to Study Compensation for Automobile Accidents. Funds have
been provided by the Rockefeller Foundation and the work is being conducted
under the auspices of the Council for Research in the Social Sciences of Colum-
bia University, with the aid of the School of Law of Yale University. The
Committee is composed largely of lawyers and was initiated as an effort on
the part of lawyers to determine whether an unsatisfactory legal situation can
be met by new methods." Supra note 1, p. 97. The organization of this com-
mittee is probably a result of the beneficial work done by smaller committees
in a number of the states.
' Special courts would reduce delay and tend to develop a simplified practice,
but this remedy alone would not cure the difficulty of proving negligence or
insure the financial responsibility of defendants. Also, only the populous dis-
tricts could afford the expense of such courts.
'For a discussion as to the extent and method of shifting the burden of
proof in such cases, see comment in this issue of the N. C. LAw REv., p. 309.
' Ten states have adopted laws tending to increase the financial responsibility
of automobile owners for injuries caused by their automobiles. See Ballantine,
Study of Compensation for Automobile Accidents, supra note 1, at page 99.
See also, Elsbree and Roberts, Compulsory Insurance Against Motor Vehicle
Accidents (1928) 76 U. of PA. L. Rav. 690.
In the "compulsory liability plan," it is believed, lies the ultimate solution
to the automobile accident problem. Analogy can be found in the almost uni-
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extensive employment of presumptions today in extending the doc-
trine of respondeat superior suggests a discussion of their effect in
automobile accident cases.
A recent North Carolina cases not only approves the apparently
general rule that proof of ownership of car plus proof that the
driver was acting within the general employment of the owner creates
a prima facie case that the driver was acting within the course of his
employment at the time of the injury,9 but also raises the question
whether the direct, uncontradicted' o evidence of a defendant when
offered in rebuttal of such a prima facie case entitles him to a directed
verdict." In this case, a negro, employed by the defendant corpor-
ation to drive its truck, injured the plaintiff while driving the truck.
Defendant offered direct, uncontradicted evidence that it had ordered
the negro not to drive the truck without express orders, that the
negro was driving the truck at the time of the injury without express
orders, and that the driver was, at that time, on his way to see his
sick mother during lunch hour. The Supreme Court held that de-
fendant's motion for non-suit was properly overruled and that the
jury was justified in finding for the plaintiff. In discussing this
problem two questions arise at the outset, namely whether a defend-
ant under such circumstances is always entitled as a matter of right to
versal enactment of Workmen's Compensation Acts and the efficacy of such
acts (in which compensation is fixed by statute regardless of the fault of the
parties) has been well established. This plan has also been suggested as a
workable device in settling similar problems arising railroad accidents. Note
(1929) 8 N. C. L. REv. 50, 51. See also Ballantine, Study of Compensation
for Automobile Accidents, supra note 1; Elsbree and Roberts, Compulsory
Ins., etc., supra note 6.
'Jeffrey v. Osage Manufacturing Co., 197 N. C. 724, 150 S. E. 503 (1929).
'It is generally held that proof of ownership plus proof of general employ-
ment creates a presumption of respondeat superior. In some courts, mere proof
of ownership is sufficient to raise such a presumption. Still others impose the
heavier burden of the risk of non-persuasion upon the defendant automobile
owner. For discussion of above rules, see HUDDY on AUToBiOBILEs (7th ed.)
§§795, 796; (1930) 10 BosToN U. L. REv. 83; comment in this issue of N. C, L.
REv., p. 309.10By "uncontradicted evidence of defendant" is meant that evidence of the
defendant which has not been opposed by the contradicting, direct evidence of
the plaintiff. It is clear that even the circumstantial evidence of a plaintiff
might "contradict," in a sense, the evidence of a defendant.
' Although North Carolina does not allow a peremptory ruling in favor of
the one having the burden of proof in the primary sense, i.e. the burden of
the issue, Anniston Nat. Bank v. School Committee of Durham, 121 N. C.
107, 28 S. E. 134 (1897), there would apparently be no objection to allowing
a directed verdict for a defendant automobile owner, because the burden of
proof in the primary sense is not on him, but still remains upon the plaintiff
to ultimately prove negligence.
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a peremptory ruling of the court and, if not, when is he entitled to
such a ruling.
At first glance it would seem that a defendant should always be
entitled to a favorable ruling when he has offered uncontradicted
evidence in opposition to a presumption because the rule that a pre-
sumption disappears upon the production of rebutting evidence 12
would seemingly leave the plaintiff, who has relied solely upon the
presumption, without any case. However true the statement as to
the presumption's disappearance may be, it does not always follow
that the plaintiff is actually left without support, because, granting
that the presumption does disappear, there are still left the proved
facts upon which the presumption was based which are circumstantial
or inferential evidence to be weighed against the direct evidence of
the defendant. For example, proof of the fact that X has in his
possession stolen goods, upon which the presumption that X stole
them is based,13 is strong circumstantial evidence, irrespective of the
presumption, that X actually stole the goods; and, proof of the facts
that a letter was duly addressed, stamped, mailed, upon which the
presumption that said letter was received by the addressde' 4 is based,
is cogently inferential of the fact that the letter was received.
However, the facts upon which many presumptions are based are
not always as persuasive as those illustrated by the situations in the
foregoing paragraph, and in fact, there are some presumptions which
are altogether devoid of any inferential force whose existence is
justified solely upon the ground of policy. Thus, a statutory pre-
sumption' 5 of negligence against a railway company upon proof that
plaintiff was injured by its train is not based as much upon the prob-
ability that such injuries usually result from the negligence of the
company as upon the policy of requiring the defendant railroad to
come forward with certain facts peculiarly within its own knowledge
which are essential to an expeditious and fair determination of the
case. The presumption that goods damaged in transit were injured
by the last connecting carrier is a striking example of a presumption
"5 WIGmoRE, EviDENCE (1923) §2491; McCormick, Presumptions and Bur-
den of Proof (1927) 5 N. C. L. Rav. 291, 297.
' State v. Van Buren, 30 Del. 79, 102 Atl. 981 (1918) ; State v. Court, 225
Mo. 609, 125 S. W. 451 (1910).
"Dunlop v. U. S., 165 U. S. 486, 17 Sup. Ct. 375, 41 L. ed. 799 (1897);
Holloman v. Sou. R. Co., 172 N. C. 372, 90 S. E. 292 (1916).
' Miss. Ann. Code (Hemmingway, 1927) §1645. Mobile, etc., R. R. v.
Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35, 31 Sup. Ct. 136, 55 L. ed. 78 (1910).
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based solely upon policy without any "logical core,"'10 because it is
just as probable that the damage was done by any other of the con-
necting carriers. So, where the presumption is based upon a strong
probability, it is clear that the plaintiff has made out a sufficient case
to go to the jury despite the defendant's direct evidence. Likewise,
it is equally obvious that where the presumption has no "logical
core," the plaintiff, when opposed by direct, uncontradicted evidence,
should be nonsuited because there are no legs upon which his case
can stand once the presumption has disappeared.
But, in the more numerous cases where the presumptions are
founded both upon probability and some basis of policy the decisions
reach varying results because of (1) the mistaken view of some
courts that the plaintiff has no case when the presumption disappears;
(2) the varying degrees of weight given to the probability element
in presumptions;17 and (3) the presence or absence of peculiar cir-
cumstances weakening or fortifying the credibility of the direct evi-
dence of the defendant.1 s Thus, where defendant offered uncon-
tradicted evidence in rebuttal of the presumption of negligence
against a railway company upon proof that its train killed plaintiff's
cattle, the defendant was allowed a directed verdict,'0 whereas, in
another jurisdiction, in a case identical to the one above, it was held
that the case was one for the jury to determine.20 Also, where de-
fendant railway company offered evidence that its engines were
equipped with improved spark arresters, it was allowed a directed
verdict despite the presumption of negligence based upon proof that
plaintiff's land adjoining defendant's tracks was burned.2 ' Further,
" Chafee, Progress of the Law, Evidence (1921), 35 HARV. L. REV. 302, 311.
See also, Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law Upon the
Burden of Proof (1920) 68 U. OF PA. L. REV. 307, 317, 320. THiAYER, TREAT-
ISE ON EVIDENCE, 314. 2 CHAMBERLAYNE, EVIDENCE, 1332, 1214.
'1For example, Court X might consider it highly probable that defendant
is guilty of manufacturing whiskey upon proof that a still was found upon
his premises, whereas, on the other hand, Court Y might consider it inprob-
able that defendant manufactured whiskey merely because a still was found
upon his land, and justify such a presumption mainly upon the ground that the
defendant can easily disprove it and thereby expedite trial procedure.
"8Using same illustration, supra note 18, Court X might consider it less
probable that defendant was distilling whiskey upon proof that defendant's
premises comprised some thousand acres of land and that the still was found
quite a distance from his residence; and, Court Y might consider it probable
that defendant was guilty, if it were proved that the still was found in the
basement of the house in which defendant was dwelling.
"Memphis, etc. R. Co. v. Shoecraft, 53 Ark. 96, 13 S. W. 422 (1890).
'Hardison v. Atl. etc. R. Co., 120 N. C. 492, 26 S. E. 630 (1897).
Menomenie, R. S. & D. Co. v. Ry. Co., 91 Wis. 447, 65 N. W. 176 (1895);
4 WxaIoRE, EVIDENCE (1923) §2487, page 3529.
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most courts hold that defendant's uncontradicted evidence that he
did not receive a letter offered against the presumption of receipt
based upon proof of proper mailing does not entitle him to a per-
emptory ruling,22 although some courts, under like circumstances, do
allow a directed verdict.23 The same divergence of opinion is found
in cases involving the presumption that a person in control of de-
fendant's motor vehicle is a servant acting within the course of his
employment. Some states hold that defendant's uncontradicted evi-
dence should entitle him to a directed verdict, 24 the majority hold
that it should not.25 In those states belonging to the latter class,
however, there are numerous instances where plaintiff was nonsuited
upon the defendant's uncontradicted evidence, not because of any
rule that defendant was entitled to a favorable ruling as a matter of
right, but because the weight and credibility of the defendant's evi-
dence in the particular case clearly overbore the plaintiff's circum-
stantial evidence. For example, where the defendant proved that the
accident occurred outside the working hours of the driver, 26 that the
driver was exclusively employed in work other than that of driving
defendant's car and was never permitted to drive it,27 that the driver
was clearly using the car for his own purpose and could not, under
the circumstances, have been using it for the defendant 28 and where
defendant's evidence is based upon the testimony of disinterested
witnesses, 29 a peremptory ruling has been given for the defendant.
Rosenthal v. Walker, 111 U. S. 185, 4 Sup. Ct. 382, 28 L. ed. 395 (1884) ;
Standard Tr. etc. Co. v. N. Y. etc. Bank, 166 N. C. 112, 81 S. E. 1074 (1914).
"1 Grade v. Mariposa County, 132 Cal. 75, 64 Pac. 117 (1901) ; Ault v. Inter-
state Say. etc. Ass'n., 15 Wash. 627, 47 Pac. 13 (1896).
"4 Frank v. Wright, 140 Tenn. 538, 205 S. W. 434 (1918) ; Nattans v. Cotton,
133 Atl. 270 (Md. 1926); Pollock v. Watts, 142 Md. 403, 121 Atl. 238 (1923).
See also, Guthrie v. Holmes, 272 Mo. 215, 198 S. W. 854 (1917), but compare
with Barz v. Fleishman Yeast Co., 308 Mo. 288, 271 S. W. 361 (1925).
"D'Aleria v. Shirey, 286 Fed. 523 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923); Dowdell v.
Beasley, 17 Ala. App. 100, 82 Sou. 40 (1919); Crain v. Sumida, 59 Cal. App.
590, 211 Pac. 479 (1922) ; Ward v. Teller Reservoir and Irrigation Co., 60 Col.
47, 153 Pac. 219 (1915); Gallagher v. Gunn, 16 Ga. App. 600, 85 S. E. 930
(1915) ; Purdy v. Sherman, 74 Wash. 309, 133 Pac. 440 (1913).
" Guthrie v. Holmes, supra note 25.
'Reich v. Cone, 180 N. C. 267, 104 S. E. 530 (1920).
' Callahan v. Weybosset Pure Food Market, 47 R. I. 361, 133 Atl. 442
(1926).
"It is undoubtedly the general rule that where unimpeaehed witnesses
testify distinctly and positively to a fact and are uncontradicted, their testimony
should be credited and have the effect of overcoming a mere presumption.
But this rule is subject to many qualifications. There may be such a degree
of improbability in the statements themselves as to deprive them of credit,
however positively made. The witnesses, though unimpeached, may have such
an interest in the question at issue as to affect their credibility.... And fur-
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It is submitted, in conclusion, that in deciding whether or not
defendant's uncontradicted direct evidence should entitle him to a
peremptory ruling, a court should first determine whether or not the
particular presumption has a logical core, i.e. a basis in probability.
If it does not, the ruling should be given, providing there is no
shadow upon the credibility of the defendant's evidence. If the pre-
sumption does have a basis of probability, then the weight of this
probability should be balanced against the evidence of the defendant,
as in any other case of conflict between circumstantial evidence (not
raising a technical presumption) and direct evidence, and a peremp-
tory ruling for defendant given or refused upon the usual test of
whether or not reasonable minds could reach only one conclusion.
J. FRAZIER GLENN, JR.
Insurance-Insurable Interest in Life of Copartner
A and H, partners in an insurance business, each took out a policy
on his life for the benefit of the partnership. The premiums were paid
out of the earnings of the business. There was a partnership disso-
lution, A selling all of his interest, except accounts and notes receiv-
able. H surrendered the policy on A's life and demanded the cash
surrender value. A made demand for his proportionate share.
Held: that the policy, together with its cash surrender value, was a
partnership asset which passed to H.1
The instant case seems undoubtedly correct on the basis that if a
partner has an insurable interest in the life of his copartner, then a
partnership has an insurable interest in the life of a partner.
2
Wagering policies were abolished in England by statutes.3 Amer-
ican courts have generally held, irrespective of statutes, that wager-
thermore, it is often difficult to decide when a witness is, in a legal sense,
uncontradicted. He rhay be contradicted by circumstance as well as by state-
ments of others contrary to his own. In such cases, courts and juries are not
bound to refrain from exercising their judgment and to blindly adopt the state-
ments of the witness, for the simple reason that no other witness has denied
them, and that the character of the witness is not impeached." By Rapallo,
J., Elwood v. Western Union Co., 45 N. Y. 549, 553 (1871).
'Allen v. Hudson, 35 F. (2d) 330 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929).
'If a partner has an insurable interest in the life of his copartner, he has
it whether it is the whole or a fractional -part of the beneficial interest in the
policy. Since he has a fractional interest in the partnership, it would seem
that he had an insurable interest.
819 Geo. II, c. 37 and 14 Geo. III, c. 48.
